Emperor Has No Clothes: EU\u27s Cyprus Challenge by Yeşilada, Birol A. & Sozen, Ahmet
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Political Science Faculty Publications and
Presentations Political Science
2008
Emperor Has No Clothes: EU's Cyprus Challenge
Birol A. Yeşilada
Portland State University, yesilada@pdx.edu
Ahmet Sozen
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/polisci_fac
Part of the International Relations Commons
This Post-Print is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications and Presentations
by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Citation Details
"Emperor Has No Clothes: EU's Cyprus Challenge" with Ahmet Sozen, in The Cyprus Conflict: Looking Ahead, Ahmet Sozen, ed.
(Famagusta, TRNC: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, 2008): 103-120.
Birol Yesilada Page 1 
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In the words of the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “membership of 
[politically divided] Cyprus in the European Union coupled with Turkey’s membership 
aspirations has seriously complicated future peace negotiations on the island.” (Hürriyet, 
June 16, 2006). This is a rather harsh assessment of EU’s Cyprus policy given the fact 
that membership in the Union would most likely create the optimal conditions for peace 
and stability between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Yet, EU membership of one side at 
the expense of the other community, seem to have created more obstacles for peace.  This 
paper provides a critical analysis of EU’s Cyprus policy.  It examines: (1) the 
contradictions between EU’s desire to establish direct economic and trade link with the 
Turkish Cypriots and EU’s legal framework, (2) assesses agenda setting process in the 
EU and its implications for relations with the Turkish Cypriots, and (3) provides ad 
agent-based analysis of the current impasses surrounding (1). 
A Brief Background. 
 
There is no doubt about the seriousness of Annan’s above statement. In fact, the 
combined efforts of the international community, led by the US, EU, and UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, to solve the Cyprus problem before eastern enlargement of the EU 
in May 2004 were aimed at preventing future impasse in Cyprus. That is the reason 
behind closely formulating the Annan Peace plan around EU’s Accession Treaty and 
relevant EU laws and regulations.   
 
During the pre-referendum negotiations, the Annan Plan underwent five revisions.  
The reformist new government in Ankara, led by the Islamist AK Party of Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, consolidated its power and withdrew support from the hard line Turkish Cypriot 
leader Rauf Denktaş.  With loss of such support, Denktaş’s followers lost ground in the 
national elections in the TRNC in December 2003.  The new Turkish Cypriot leadership, 
led by Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat, signaled its willingness to support the Annan 
Plan. These developments, however, coincided with national elections in the Greek part 
of Cyprus where an ultranationalist former EOKA leader Tasso’s Papadopoulos 
succeeded reformist and pro-unification president Chlorides.  To make matters worse, the 
progressive government of Semites and Papandreou in Greece lost the national elections 
and was replaced by center rightist Constantine Karamanlis who did not show any sign of 
pressuring Papadopoulos to accept the Annan Plan.   
 
With this backdrop, the parties met in New York under the auspices of the Secretary 
General and agreed to try to work out their differences and present a peace plan for their 
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respective citizens in separate referendum prior to May 1, 2004 accession date.  The 
parties further agreed that if the two Cypriot leaders failed to reach a compromise, 
representatives of Greece and Turkey would join them and try to reach a solution. If that 
effort also failed, the Secretary General would simply “fill-in” the blanks and present the 
parties a final peace document.  The final Plan did not reflect a compromise the leaders 
jointly endorsed. The Turkish side was more inclined to accept it whereas the Greek side 
saw it as being unacceptable.  Much has been written recently on the Annan Plan and the 
Cyprus problem recently (for example see Anastasiou 2007, Kaufmann 2007, Lindley 
2007, Loizides 2007, Sözen 2007 and Sözen and Özersay 2007).  
 
The merits of the Annan Plan are beyond the scope of this paper. It should suffice to 
state that key elements of the Annan Plan called for (International Crisis Group, March 8, 
2006:3-5): 
 
1.  The Annan Plan provided for the establishment of a new federal republic, with a 
United Cyprus Republic (UCR), with two constituent states – of the Greek Cypriot 
community in the south and the Turkish Cypriot community in the north. 
Constitutionally, the plan allocated most powers to the two constituent states, with 
the federal level of government responsible principally for foreign relations, 
monetary policy, federal finance, Republic citizenship and immigration. 
2.  The executive was to be constituted by a presidential council comprising nine 
members (of which at least three would be Turkish Cypriots) holding office for five 
years. 
3.  The presidency of the council would rotate between the two communities.  
4.  The federal parliament would be composed of two houses, and decisions would 
normally require the approval of both chambers by simple majority, including one 
quarter of the senators from each constituent state. The lower house would be 
elected based on constituent state citizenship, provided that the Turkish Cypriot state 
held at least one quarter of the seats. The upper house would be composed of an 
equal number of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Constituent state elections 
would be based on permanent residency.  
5.  The Supreme Court would have an equal number of Greek Cypriots, Turkish 
Cypriots, and foreign members – 3 members each. 
6.  The Turkish Cypriot territory would comprise 29% of the island (as opposed to 
36% at present).  
7  A total number of 120,000 Greek Cypriots would be able to return to live in 
their old houses in the North of the island.  In order to avoid a flood of Greek 
Cypriots, feared by the Turkish community, their proportion would be limited to 
18% of the population in the Turkish Cypriot zone. 
8.  All Cypriot security forces were to be disbanded, and the mainland Greek and 
Turkish contingents would have been reduced to 6,000 apiece by 2011 and 3,000 
by 2018 (or by the date of Turkey’s EU accession). Thereafter, numbers would be 
scaled down to the original 950 and 650 troops respectively foreseen in the Treaty of 
Alliance, with the objective of complete demilitarization. A UN peacekeeping force, 
empowered by a new mandate, would monitor implementation of the agreement. 
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Unfortunately, the Annan Peace plan did not materialize.  In separate referendums, the 
Cypriots failed to agree on the peace plan – over three-quarters of Greek Cypriots voted 
“no” while two-thirds of Turkish Cypriots voted “yes.” With these results, Greek 
Cypriots joined the EU on May 1, 2004 while the Turkish Cypriots found themselves in 
political limbo awaiting when and how the international community would reward their 
goodwill effort.  
 
Kofi Annan called upon the international community to eliminate economic 
restrictions and barriers on the Turkish Cypriots and this was echoed by former U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and EU Commissioner Verheugen, British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, and the EU Council of Ministers (prior to enlargement) 
(International Crisis Group, 2006:12). Several reasons stood behind this call.  First, the 
international community felt obligated to compensate the Turkish Cypriots, who despite 
their positive vote, would be excluded from the benefits of EU accession. Second,  as 
noted by the International Crisis Group (ibid) “since the Turkish Cypriot unilateral 
declaration of independence in 1983, the international community has adhered to UN 
Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), which called upon states not to 
assist the secession of northern Cyprus. Normalising the economic situation in the north 
was viewed as a form of assistance to secession.”  As far as Kofi Annan was concerned, 
the Turkish Cypriots’ vote for reunification invalidated the political logic of isolation.  
And third, lifting the isolation was viewed as a catalyst for reunification as it would 
initiate economic development of the north and bridge the gap between the two sides. 
 
 In the UN Security Council, Annan’s Cyprus report met Russian opposition and 
never reached full hearing.  In the EU, the situation was even more precarious. Prior to 
the referendum, EU officials promised to reward the Turkish Cypriots if they voted in 
favor of the Annan Plan.  Following the Greek Cypriots rejection, Enlargement 
Commissioner Gunter Verhuegen went even further and presented a scathing criticism of 
President Papadopoulos for hijacking the EU process and for wanting to use the EU 
membership to pressure the Turkish side to cave in to Greek Cypriot wishes.  Similar 
statement followed from the president of the European Parliament.  In an attempt to 
reward the Turkish side for its endorsement of the Annan Plan, Brussels Commission 
prepared a policy package that would have established direct trade between north Cyprus 
and EU markets and provided for 249 million euros in direct aid.  Verhuegen argued that 
“I am making a serious call on our member states to make a decision to stick to their 
promises [to the Turkish Cypriots],” adding that the European Commission had done, and 
was willing to do, everything it could to back the Turkish Cypriots (Bahceli, September 
14, 2004). Despite such good will, the efforts of the Commission failed in both tasks as 
the Council of Ministers ruled that the plans violated existing EU regulations since North 
Cyprus (“TRNC”) could not be viewed as separate legal territory from member state 
Cyprus.  Therefore, all EU linkages to the Turkish side of the island would have to go 
through the official government of Cyprus – which the Turkish Cypriots reject.  Given 
the enormity of this outcome, what legal obstacles stand in the way of EU in establishing 
direct ties with Turkish Cypriots? 
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Problems with EU’s Cyprus Policy and Institutional Challenges  
 
Despite its good intentions aimed at rewarding Turkish Cypriots, the EU met legal and 
administrative obstacles in its efforts.  The initial plan of Verhuegen was to find a 
formula for providing direct economic aid and establishing direct trade with the North.  
The proposed plan would have permitted tariff free trade between the EU and North 
Cyprus (for good wholly or substantially produced in the north).  In order to accomplish 
this goal, the Commission argued that the existing problem of “origin certificates,” which 
the Greek Cypriots successfully argued in the ECJ decision of 1994, could be overcome 
by recognizing certificates issued by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce since 
this institution was established under the 1960 arrangement that created the Republic of 
Cyprus. The Commission based its argument behind Article 133 of the EU Treaty that 
regulates trade with third parties (territories) and is used to regulate trade with territories 
that are part of an EU member state but are not included in its customs territory, such as 
Ceuta and Melilla (Ibid). They had hoped to argue that, in lieu of referendum results and 
the Council’s call for ending economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots, north Cyprus 
presented such a territory.   
 
However, the Greek Cypriots argued that the regulation fell under Protocol 10 of the 
Accession Treaty (which addressed the particulars of the Cyprus problem and its linkage 
to accession).  As the Protocol stipulates, partial lifting of the suspension of the acquis to 
the north requires unanimity in the Council.  The legal office of the Council supported 
this interpretation.  The outcome of these interpretations has been devastating to original 
intent of the Commission.  Gradually, those members of the EU that wanted to see 
through Commission’s goal one by one withdrew their efforts and accepted the legal 
impasse.  The Luxembourg, UK, and German presidencies pushed very hard to break 
Cyprus’s opposition to the plan.  In each case, they met Greek Cypriot veto and decided 
to separate economic aid package from direct trade/air link with the north.  The Greek 
Cypriots even won a cheap victory in the aid package by demanding, “the passage of the 
aid regulation be tied to a more restrictive interpretation by the Commission of the trade 
regulation’s likely remit. When a draft of the Commission’s proposed explanatory text 
reached the Turkish Cypriots, they declared it unacceptable, and the process again 
collapsed, this time with the loss of €120m of the €259m package thanks to the ending of 
the 2005 financial year. The aid regulation was eventually passed on 27 February 2006, 
with no explanatory declaration attached.” (Ibid: 13). With success in this area, the Greek 
Cypriots moved diligently to block many other attempts of Turkish Cypriots with EU 
institutions that included exclusion of universities of north Cyprus from participating in 
the Erasmus program (Turkish Cypriot dailies). 
 
In a similar fashion, air link between north Cyprus and the rest of the world (except 
Turkey) cannot be established as long as international conventions and the UN view 
Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate representative of Cyprus. Short of the UN 
Security Council’s future resolution that would lift economic isolation of the north, direct 
air flights to airports in TRNC cannot be established.  Thus, EU countries have been gun 
shy in taking steps to establish such air link with the north. 
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The above situation creates a major embarrassment for the EU as it finds itself in a 
quandary.  On the one hand, it wants to fulfil its promise to Turkish Cypriots.  On the 
other hand, it finds its hands tied by legal issues and Greek Cypriot (and probably 
Greece) veto. In the meantime, the EU principles of fairness and justice remain 
unfulfilled as far as Turkish Cypriots and their supporters in the EU are concerned.   
 
The main institutional challenge for resolving this dilemma concerns agenda setting 
in the EU.  As long as the Commission and the Council address the Cyprus policies 
within EU’s legal framework, the issue can only be addressed as part of ordinary agenda 
and face all the problems explained above. That would suit the interests of Greek Cypriot 
leaders who wish to transform the Cyprus problem into an intra-EU issue that can be 
resolved through EU’s legal framework. Unfortunately, to them, Cyprus is still a political 
problem where UN Secretary General continues to oversee international mediation 
efforts.  North Cyprus is technically in the EU but the acquis remains suspended until a 
political solution is found to island’s division.  This is because the EU admitted the whole 
of Cyprus into the Union as stated in Cyprus’s application for membership and the 
subsequent Accession Treaty.  However, the problem Cyprus is not only a legal problem.  
Fundamentally, it is a political problem which none of the existing legal framework of 
the EU could address.  It should be handled as an extra ordinary agenda item by the EU at 
the level of the European Council (heads of states and governments).  It is at this 
institution where political will of all parties concerned can addressed and dealt with at the 
highest level of political authority.  The European Council itself sets its own 
extraordinary agenda by creating special intergovernmental bodies to examine issues and 
report back its recommendations, like the intergovernmental conference that the 
December 2001 Laeken summit scheduled for 2004, which produced the Constitutional 
Treaty (Wood and Yesilada 2007: Ch 6).   
 
Some might argue that such a move would be futile given veto powers of member 
states like Cyprus and Greece at the summit meeting of the European Council. There is 
validity behind this position and this is why finding a solution should not be an EU only 
effort. It has to include all relevant parties including the UN, the US, and Turkey (who 
holds out on extending its Customs Union agreement to Cyprus unless the EU delivers its 
promise to Turkish Cypriots).  In order to examine the likelihood of resolving this 
problem, I next carried out an agent-based analysis of the bargaining space on EU trade 
with north Cyprus. 
Agent-based Analysis of the Cyprus Bargaining Space 
 
The agent-based model examines one issue among many that surround the Cyprus 
problem.  For the purposes of this paper, I only consider economic isolation of north 
Cyprus and various positions stake holders prefer.  Stakeholders and their positions can 
be found in Appendix I.  The program utilized is developed by Jacek Kugler and his 
associates at the Sentia Corporation. 
 
The algorithms that are combined in the software include game theory, decision theory 
(bounded rationality), risk, and special bargaining. The methodology provides an 
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explanation of how policy positions of competing interests evolve over time.  It leads to 
predictions about policy outcomes and identifies strategic opportunities for altering them.  
 
The model is a substantial improvement over the earlier Expected Utility model. It is 
based in part on Black’s (1958) median voter theorem and Banks’ (1990) theorem about 
the monotonicity between expectations and the escalation of political disputes.  The 
model predicts behavior as a consequence of rational desired outcomes of the parties and 
their strategic interactions, not as an extension of past behavior. This approach simulates 
the shifts in position of individual stakeholders over time in response to the pressure that 
occurs during bargaining. The model is driven by a game in which actors simultaneously 
make proposals and exert influence on one another.  They then evaluate options and build 
coalitions by shifting positions on the issue in question.  
 
The logical flow of the model assesses how decision makers evaluate whether or not 
they will challenge policy if their expected value for action is positive or negative. A 
stakeholder’s probability of success depends upon its ability to influence, as well as its 
anticipated chance of success at convincing others to support the position advocated. The 
utility for success is the policy gain the stakeholder receives by acting and changing the 
policy outcome more in line with their desired position. The probability of failure is 
related to the constellation of opposing stakeholders, while the utility of failure is based 
on the policy consequences from a failed policy challenge.  
 
Using this process, the model provides a complete mapping of the relationships and 
perceptions of each stakeholder vis-à-vis every other stakeholder. The policy proposals 
and the subsequent responses begin to give insights into the process, anticipating policy 
dynamics and outcomes. In some cases, there are individual stakeholders who can apply a 
veto to any settlement, despite forecasted agreement by other parties. This is not the case 
in this analysis. The model thus provides a forecast of the likely settlement of policy 
issues as a function of competition, confrontation, cooperation, and negotiation. Data for 
the issues analyzed with this approach come from experts on the particular topic 
addressed. 
 
The model depends entirely on the policy acumen of experts. In this sense, it is a 
marriage of the old and the new. It takes four key types of information from experts: who 
are the stakeholders that can influence the policy outcome, what policy position do they 
currently advocate, what is their relative potential influence over the process, and finally 
how important is the issue to the policymaker. The approach uses only these data and 
then provides specific advice that helps policy analysts understand which policy options 
are likely to be successful, the sequence and timing of interventions, the nature of 
interactions among stakeholders, and the types of coalitions that will form. Feder (1995) 
provides a systematic assessment of the performance of expert-generated data with the 
Expected Utility model using a large number of cases. He finds that while experts may 
disagree with the predictions of the model, their data tend to vary only slightly and do not 
produce appreciable differences in the model forecasts. This congruence suggests that the 
results of the model are robust. 
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Note that without a guideline for the long-term interests of a nation, many actions can 
initially be seen as optimal that produce detrimental results over time. Differentiating 
between successful and unsuccessful approaches is often only possible with the benefit of 
hindsight. Our methodology allows policymakers and policy analysts to anticipate likely 
consequences ahead of time. 
 
This approach has a well-document track record of success, including an internal 
assessment of over two thousand issues by the Central Intelligence Agency, which found 
the approach to be accurate in excess of 90% of the time (study available upon request). 
The model is concerned with explaining how policy positions of competing interests 
evolve over time.  It leads to predictions about policy outcomes and identifies strategic 
opportunities for altering them.  I refer the reader to Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 
(1994); Kugler and Feng (1997); and Bueno de Mesquita (2002) for details on the 
mathematics behind this approach, and provide only a brief summary here. 
 
Analysis 
Policy preferences of stakeholders include a range of options where; 
 
0=status quo   
25=trade through GOC ports   
50= trade through jointly administered ports in the South   
75=trade through EU administered port   
100=lift isolation     
All players’ preferences, salience of their respective positions, and their respective 
resource base are based on continues assessment of the Cyprus theatre and is part of a 
larger project that brings together academics from Cyprus and the United States.  Figure 
1 shows position of all players during seven rounds of negotiations. 
 
Figure 1:  Stakeholders positions over time
France 
US
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For identification of key actors 
 
 
As negotiations continue, France is likely to move toward lifting of economic isolation of 




Figure 2: France (round 3) and US (round 5) Move
France move 
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At the third round, France’s move precipitates other moves including US resulting in 
large concentration of capabilities favoring lift of isolation with minimal EU involvement 
(suggesting UN-level resolution).  Only Greece and Greek Cypriots oppose this 
liberalization but the outcome presents President Talat of TRNC an opportunity to move 
DISI and Greek businesses to push for lifting of economic isolation (Figure 3). 
 




Talat has opportunity to 
move  Disi and then Greek 
Business 
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Conclusions and Prospects 
 
The analysis in the paper demonstrates futility of EU’s efforts aimed at ending economic 
isolation of north Cyprus and the Union’s precarious new citizens – the Turkish Cypriots.  
While they received repeated assurances from the EU, the UN, and the US that they 
would be rewarded for voting for the Annan Plan, Turkish Cypriots face continued 
isolation from the rest of the world as political leaders of the EU quibble over when, how, 
and under what circumstances they could ease these “new EU citizens” continued 
punishment.  The presence of Greek Cypriots in the EU, despite their rejection of the 
Annan Plan, coupled with their veto of Commission’s efforts to establish direct trade with 
the north simply adds insult to injury for the Turkish Cypriots.  It is no wonder that 
Turkish Cypriots have become cynical of future EU efforts to reach out to north Cyprus 
and support for the Union has declined substantially since April 2004 as shown in recent 
Eurobarometer surveys.  Under these circumstances, the EU needs to take the bull by its 
horns and address the problem in a combined EU-US-UN strategy.  As the analysis of the 
bargaining space demonstrates, there is an opportunity for France and the US to lead the 
way in forging a solution by showing political leadership.  France under President 
Sarkozy can take the lead, supported by the UK and Germany, to emphasize the basic 
ideals of the Union – compromise, fairness, and justice.  The US, for its part, can use this 
move to push the UN Security Council to implement recommendations of former 
Secretary General Annan.  With these developments, an opportunity will arise in Cyprus 
for Turkish Cypriot president Talat to forge an alliance with Greek Cypriot DISI and 
business leaders for ending economic isolation of north Cyprus. Such an outcome would 
undoubtedly go far in bringing the two sides closer to finding a just and lasting solution 
to the Cyprus problem.




Anastasiou, Harry. 2007. “Nationalism as a Deterrent to Peace and Interethnic 
Democracy: The Failure of Nationalist Leadership from The Hague Talks to the 
Cyprus Referendum” International Studies Perspectives Vol 8 no. 2 (May):190-205. 
Bahceli, Simon. ”EU hopes rising, but Turkish Cypriots wary of broken promises” 
Cyprus Mail September 14, 2004. 
Banks, Jeffrey. 1990. “Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games,” American 
Journal of Political Science 34:599-614. 
Black, Duncan. 1958.  The Theory of Committees and Elections.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Frans N. Stokman, (eds). 1994. European Community 
Decision Making: Models, Applications, and Comparisons. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2002. Predicting Politics. Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press. 
Feder, Stanley. 1995. “Factions and Policon: New Ways to Analyze Politics,” in H. 
Bradford Westfield (ed.), Inside CIA’s Private World. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, pp. 274-292. 
International Crisis Group. 2006.  The Cyprus Stalemate: What’s Next?Brussels: Europe 
Report No. 171. 
Kaufmann, Chaim. 2007. “An Assessment of the Partition of Cyprus,” International 
Studies Perspectives. Vol. 8 no. 2 (May):206-23. 
Kugler, Jacek, and Yi Feng, (eds.) (1997). “Special Issue: The Expected Utility Approach 
to Policy Decision Making: Assessments, Forecasts, and Strategies.” International 
Interactions, Vol. 23, Nos. 3-4, pp. 233-394. 
Lindley, Dan. 2007. “Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of 
Cyprus.” International Studies Perspectives. Vol. 8. no. 2 (May):224-41 
Loizides, Neophytos G. 2007. “Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus.” 
International Studies Perspectives. Vol. 8 no 2 (May):172-89. 
Sözen, Ahmet. 2007. “The Cyprus Impasse: And the Way Out?” in Cyprus after 
Accession: Getting Past ‘No’? Oxford: SEES Workshop Report (May):66-74 
Sözen, Ahmet and Kudret Özersay. 2007. “The Annan Plan: State Succession or 
Continuity,” Middle Eastern Studies. Vol 43. no. 1(January):125-41. 
Wood, David and Birol Yesilada. 2007. The Emerging European Union,4th ed. New 
York: Longman Publishers. 
 
 
Birol Yesilada Page 12 
APPENDIX I 




                     Issue 1: Economic Isolation of North Cyprus  
0      100 
       
0=status quo   
25=trade through GOC ports   
50= trade through jointly administered ports in the South   
75=trade through EU administered port   
100=lift isolation 
    
       
 Actor Weight Power Position Salience veto 
 Cypriot Turks 10       power 
 President Talat   70 100 90  
 CTP-BG   60 100 90  
 BDH    5 100 90  
 DP   25 100 90  
 UBP   35 100 90  
 Business Turks   15 100 90  
 Unions - Teachers   15 100 90  
 Media Pro   20 100 90  
 Media Anti   5 100 90  
 Peace Activist   5 100 90  
 UHH   5 100 90  
 Public Opinion   30 100 90  
 Greek Cypriots 15       yes 
 Pres. Papadopoulos   100 0 90 yes 
 Disi   40 50 70  
 Akel   60 25 70  
 Diko   30 25 85  
 Kisos   15 25 85  
 Other Parties   5 25 80  
 Business Greeks   15 25 70  
 Union Left   10 25 70  
 Union Right   5 0 70  
 CYBC   15 0 70  
 ANTENA   5 25 77  
 ERT   10 25 70  
 MEGA   5 25 77  
 SIGMA   10 25 80  
 Public Opinion   20 0 75  
 Church   25 0 90  
 Greece 45        
 PM/Karamanlis   70 25 70 yes 
 PASOK   60 25 75  
 ERT   15 25 70  
 MEGA   10 25 70  
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 ANTENA   10 25 70  
 Church   20 0 85  
 Business   30 25 50  
 Public Opinion   30 25 70  
 Foreign Actors 400        
 US   300 75 10  
 EU commission   10 100 80  
 Germany   20 100 20 yes 
 UK   20 100 25 yes 
 France   20 25 30 yes 
 other EU   20 100 20 yes 
 EU Parliament   5 75 25  
 UN   25 100 20  
 Turkey 70        
 Public Opinion   20 100 70  
 Opposition Parties   15 100 80  
 President   25 100 90  
 Military   80 100 90  
 Prime Minister/AKP   75 100 85  
 Media Pro   25 100 70  
 Media Anti   10 100 90  
 Business Pro   20 100 70  
 Business Islamic   5 100 90  
       
  
 
